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ABSTRACT  
This paper addresses the acute Greek economic and social crisis that was inflicted on 
Greece since 2010 with the unleashing of the 3 consecutive bailout plans and the 
implementation of fierce austerity policies. We further scrutinise the composition of 
the soaring Greek debt and, most importantly, the unsettling utilisation of the Troika 
loans for the 2010-2015 period. We provide evidence that the vast bulk of the loans 
went overwhelmingly not to benefiting a "profligate" Greek state but to avoiding the 
write downs of bad loans made by reckless creditors (mainly, German and French 
banks) to the Greek government and private banks. We propose the temporary 
adoption of a parallel currency in the form of government IOUs, together with other 
drastic measures to reboot the ailing Greek economy inside the Eurozone. 
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1. Introduction  
Nine years since the beginning of the Great Recession, and the acute economic crisis 
afflicting the Eurozone countries does not abate. The economic malaises of the 
neoliberal* market economy that were exposed by the financial meltdown in 2008 
have been amplified by draconian austerity measures that the ‘structuralists’† have 
imposed in the common currency area. Fiscal retrenchment programmes were 
presumed to deal with what has been commonly framed as a sovereign debt 
problem. In the process, real GDP in the most deeply affected countries remains 
substantially below pre-crisis levels, leading them into a depression. Real GDP is               
-23.3% (Greece), -7.1% (Italy), -6.4% (Spain), and -2.9% (Ireland) below its respective 
2008 levels (source: Eurostat 2014). The result is an ever more serious social and 
political crisis: Greece and Spain suffer from huge unemployment rates in excess of 
25%, while youth unemployment hovers around the 50% mark. 
 
Arguably, macroeconomic indicators have recently improved in countries like Ireland 
and Spain but, whatever the temporary rebound evidenced through dry statistics, it 
is plagued by the five, in our view, main characteristics of 21st century neoliberal 
capitalism: (i) Intense tendency to inequality; (ii) Increased propensity to crisis and 
secular stagnation (as described by A. Hansen, see below) with the explosive 
financialisation of the capital accumulation process; (iii) Business concentration, 
hoarding of cash reserves and lack of productive investment by big companies; (iv) 
Casualization of the labour force (‘Gig’ underclass of labourers, ‘Uberisation’, 
impoverished middle class; and (v) Hollowing-out of democratic institutions. 
 
The aim of this study is to revisit and re-examine key economic data following the 
inception of the Euro for Greece, the undisputed ‘guinea pig’ of the ‘Alice in 
Wonderland’ economics of austerianism. We acknowledge that the synergistic forces 
behind the genesis and the unfolding of the Eurozone crisis and the Greek drama in 
                                                     
* Our current phase of capitalism is underpinned by a much named but too little understood economic 
and political philosophy called neoliberalism. Neoliberalism was first introduced by M. Friedman in 
Latin America in the 70s and was subsequently established since the early 80s, in the US during the 
tenure of R. Reagan and in the UK by M. Thatcher (in turn, a number of mature economies on both 
sides of the Atlantic endorsed market fundamentalism). Neoliberalism is a project that reduces all 
human activities to ‘homo economicus’, redefines democracy beyond the narrow confines of elections 
as a kind of market rationality-and the only criterion to judge our political class by is how successful 
they are in ‘marketising’ human relationships and the commons (pasture land, woodland and water 
supply). It is evident that neoliberalism is now starting to undermine the very institutions with which 
the capitalist establishment has traditionally been identified- the legal system, the police, parliament, 
local government. Under the earlier forms of liberal democracy these could be counted on to play a 
moderately autonomous role in tempering capitalism. Under neoliberalism they are increasingly 
shaped so that they will not be obstacles to market priorities, especially when the latter are servile to 
the interests of big business. 
† We refer to as ‘structuralists’ the dominant Eurozone policy players and their economic advisers that 
believe, out of ideological conviction, that whatever the economic problem, structural reform, 
deregulation, and fiscal flexibility in framing the future steps of austerity, will grow ailing economies 
stronger. 
 
 
 
2 
particular, are extremely deep-seated ranging from over-accumulation, surplus 
absorption, monopolization and the contemporary financialisation of the capital 
formation process that characterize the world economic system to Eurozone 
specificities. 
 
In recent related work, Hatgioannides, Karanassou and Sala (2013, 2016) addressed 
in detail the Eurozone's woes and the prospect of secular stagnation (see below) in 
the common currency area by unraveling (i) the supply-side imbalances that formed 
the core-periphery economic divide, and (ii) the necessity of the periphery's 
sovereign debt to finance imports from the export-led core. Since in a monetary 
union, a member state cannot devalue to boost its exports and put a brake on its 
imports, it is the fiscal budget balance that will have to fill up the gap left out by 
private and external sectors; hence the explosion of sovereign debt in parts of the 
periphery and the need of debt ‘mutualisation’. 
 
The prevailing view that countries of the core have funded the sovereign debts of the 
periphery was thus challenged, and subsequently it was demonstrated that the 
commonly held argument that the periphery countries (first and foremost Greece) 
have lived beyond their means –due to wages growing beyond what is justified by 
productivity gains— is in stark contrast to the trajectories followed by the wage 
shares. In addition, they provided evidence that intra-euro mercantilism was forming 
the untold economic project during the booming times 2001-2007 of the monetary 
union. 
 
They further scrutinised the credit flows, the role of FIRE (finance, insurance and real 
estate) as a major source of economic stimulus by partially soaking up surplus capital 
and the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in creating an asymmetric monetary 
union. During the pre-2008 period, it was shown that the main booming private 
enterprise of the recently deemed as troubled countries of the periphery was a 
rampant financial sector fuelling a multi-facet credit bubble. A bubble that was 
funding the unsustainable purchase of goods from the exporting core and the 
explosion in speculative property construction. At the same time, the private sector 
agents (banks, insurance companies, pension funds) of the richer and higher saving 
core, funnelled huge money flows to the poorer periphery. As this investment 
decision was driven by their quest for boosting short-term profitability, it had a 
destabilising impact on the allocation of scarce resources at the recipient states. 
During the ongoing austerity era, the very same private institutions are reversing 
former and reckless cross-border investments. The credit draught in the periphery, 
the differences in the funding costs of core/periphery states, were found to be 
symptoms of the concurrent attempts by surplus countries private creditors to 
repatriate the massive opportunistic claims they have accumulated on deficit 
countries debtors. 
 
Their original study follows and complements earlier research by Hatgioannides and 
Karanassou (2011, 2016) in which the structural and systemic flows of modern world 
capitalism that paved the way to the Great Recession were examined. They further 
elaborated on the anatomy and the apparatuses of the highly globalised monopoly-
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finance mode of resource allocation and price utility by advancing their thesis on 
Warrant economics, a power structure of insiders' capitalism. 
 
As early as 1938, the leading Keynesian economist in the US Alvin H. Hansen dubbed 
the term secular stagnation: "According to this theory, the modern developed 
capitalist economy has an enormous capacity to save, both because of its corporate 
structure and because of the very unequal distribution of personal income. But if 
adequate profitable investment opportunities are lacking, this saving potential 
translates not into real capital formation and sustained growth but into lowered 
income, mass unemployment, and chronic depression, a condition summed up in the 
term stagnation" (see Sweezy and Magdoff (2009/1987), pp.30). Secular stagnation 
might ‘prove the New Normal’‡. 
  
If, or rather when, in our opinion, should the current disastrous policies perpetuate, 
Eurozone goes into stagnation, there are many problems endemic to this block of 
countries. Most notably, that this is one region of the world where ‘rules’ have 
triumphed over even mainstream economic pragmatism (see Stockhammer and 
Sotiropoulos, 2014), forcing to pointless cuts in government spending. With 
reference to the world economy, both Summers (2013, ibid) and Krugman (2013, 
ibid) are adamants that what is needed is increased spending of all kinds to get the 
economies moving again, initially through expanded government expenditure, but 
with the object of jump-starting private investment spending. 
 
Given that since 2010, turbo charged fiscal consolidation is being undersigned by debt 
fundamentalists through 3 consecutive bailout plans (see Karanasos and 
Koutroumpis, 2016) as the prime remedy for the tumultuous state of the Greek 
economy, a fresh assessment is needed for its impact and efficacy. In the next 
Section, we reflect on the trajectories of main macroeconomic indicators before and, 
primarily, after 2010. In Section 3, we present new evidence about the composition 
of the Greek debt and most importantly the utilization of the troika (IMF, European 
Union and the ECB) loans. Section 4 outlines our proposals for a temporary resolution 
of the Greek crisis, notably with the adoption of a parallel (to the Euro currency), 
whilst, crucially, Greece remains formally a Eurozone member. Section 5 reminds the 
eerie similarity of Greece to that of Germany in the interwar period. Finally, Section 
6 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                     
‡ See Lawrence Summers (2013). Another leading Neo-Keynensian, Paul Krugman (2013) picked up 
Summers's comments arguing that "an economy facing secular stagnation...isn't just a temporary state 
of affairs, it's the norm". As Magdoff and Foster (2014) point out, "Neither Summers nor Krugman 
offer a theoretical or historical explanation for secular stagnation. Instead they focus simply on the 
liquidity trap in which interest rates approach zero-making it difficult to stimulate the economy 
monetarily by further lowering rates", ibid, pp.2. In a footnote, they carry on noting that "Hansen's 
theory is discussed by Krugman as if it merely emphasized demographic factors, not issues such as 
industrial maturity, monopoly and inequality", ibid , footnote 7, pp. 23. 
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2. The Impact of Austerity Programmes in Greece 
 
The ailing Greek economy, the first Eurozone member to fall in the spring of 2010 
under the troika of lenders' stranglehold and implement the voodoo economics of 
austerianism, is in the midst of a 1930s-scale Great Depression with a cumulative 
reduction of its GDP -during 2008 to 2015- around 25% (see Figure 1). 
 
It is important to note that GDP is a particularly inappropriate measure of the real fall 
in economic welfare. Given that the current account balance was -15% of GDP in the 
third quarter of 2008, and has been in surplus since the second half of 2013, it means 
that spending by Greeks on goods and services has fallen by a minimum of 40%. 
 
The cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance improved by 20% of GDP between 2008 and 
2014, while government employment fell by 30% between 2009 and 2014. Two ill-
conceived bailout plans (the first in 2010 and the second in 2012) accompanied by 
self-defeating economic recipes have resulted in official unemployment of 26% (see 
Figure 2a) and youth unemployment at over 50% (see Figure 2b). 
 
 
  
Figure 3a plots the level of trust that consumers have towards the Greek economy. 
The steep downward trend shows that the consumers' confidence in Greece after 
2010 fell sharply, which had a significantly negative impact on private consumption 
(see Figure 3b). 
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Figure 4 shows the collapse of private sector's credit flow and foreign direct 
investment in Greece since 2010. 
 
 
Finally, Figure 5 depicts the self-reported unmet needs for medical examinations 
(including all ages, both male and female, as a share of medical visits) and the 
percentage of the people that face the risk of poverty and social exclusion (increased 
from around 28% in 2010 to more than 35% since 2013), demonstrating the serious 
social consequences of the austerity programmes. 
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3. The Reality About the Composition and Use of Greek 
Debt 
 
Exotix, a boutique brokerage that specialises in illiquid markets, reported that the 
much heralded spring/summer 2012 Private Sector Involvement Initiative (PSI) which 
restructured €200 billion of the Greek government bonds debt pile, had still left about 
€62 billion (approximately 31% of the wilting Greek GDP in 2012) of bonds of varying 
maturities held by private investors. Collectively known as the ‘strip’, these bonds (in 
November 2012) were trading at an average price of 25 cents on the euro. 
Interestingly, in response to the ‘bad’ idea of bond buybacks, entertained by 
Eurozone officials (who wanted to avoid inevitable decisions on their own loans) on 
how to tackle Greece's ominous debt trajectory, hedge funds were investing in the 
strip with the expectation of sheer profiteering should a future buyback be tabled9
 
Approximately 8 billion Euros was accounted by the international law bonds held 
by the private sector that have been exempted from the 2012 restructuring, as it 
could have triggered a series of lawsuits by the hedge funds in possession.  
 
Greek banks disposed of almost 30 billion Euros of new bonds in December 2012 
in a buyback scheme agreed with international lenders that reduced the country's 
debt by around 20billion Euros, still hold the bulk of the short-term debt, 
amounting to some 15billion Euros in Treasury bills, which were rolled over in 
monthly auctions before even this funding facility of the Greek state was curtailed 
by the ECB in 2015, having reached the upper allowed threshold. Greece's four 
systemic banks are understood to hold 2 billion Euros of new bond issuances and 
other 4-5billion Euros of new bonds created after the 2012 debt swap. In total, 
private sector investors hold around 15% of the country’s debt burden. Those 
include investors such as Capital Group that hold restructured debt, and fund 
managers such as Carmignac-Gestion that took part in the sale of new debt, as 
well as investors who held international law bonds and refused to take part in the 
2012 debt swap. 
 
Despite the colossal (as a % of GDP and outstanding debt) restructuring which in 
reality destroyed the assets (held in the form of government bonds) of the main 
pension funds and eroded the wealth of small to medium treasury bond investors, 
Greece's debt burden miraculously increased and surpassed in 2014 the 180% of 
the country's GDP (see Figure 6). 
 
                                                     
9 The Financial Times (2012, December 18) reported that Third Point "One of the world's most 
prominent hedge funds is sitting on a $500m profit after making a bet that Greece would not be forced 
to leave the eurozone, ...[it] tendered the majority of a $1billion position in Greek government bonds, 
built up only months earlier, as part of a landmark debt buyback deal by Athens on Monday [December 
17], ... The Greek government swapped holdings of its own debt for notes issued by one of the 
eurozone's rescue facilities at a value of 34 cents on the euro. Third Point had scooped up holdings of 
Greek debt earlier this year for just 17 cents on the euro." 
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As of the beginning of 2015, Greece's estimated €317billion of sovereign liabilities 
is overwhelmingly owned to the troika of international lenders (approximately 
€270billion) with an approximate breakdown shown in Table 1 below: 
 
 
 
It seems like that since the crisis hit, the rest of the Eurozone and the IMF have 
been extraordinarily altruistic to Greece. Was it so? A reality check shows an 
unsettling utilization of the troika loans (and own Greek financing, albeit relatively 
small, through the issuance of short-term Treasury bills) for the 2010-15 period of 
two successive, yet ill-conceived, bailout plans: Out of a total of €254.4 billion, the 
sum of €226.7 billion were loans supplied by the Eurozone and the IMF (about 
125% of Greece's 2015Q1 GDP). The breakdown of where the money actually went 
is striking and is shown in Table 2 below: 
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Clearly, the vast bulk of the loans went overwhelmingly not to benefiting a 
‘profligate’ Greek state13 but to avoiding the write downs of bad loans by reckless 
creditors (mainly, German and French banks) to the Greek government and Greek 
banks. In a word, money came in and flowed out again from Greece for bailing out, 
indirectly through Greek's state liabilities, private creditors. We can only ponder 
as to why the Greek crisis is still profiled as a debt crisis. 
 
July 2015 seals an immolation of Greece. In exchange of what is called ‘the third 
bailout’ (potentially worth 85 billion), it is in reality the imposition of new debts to 
pay existing creditors. The Greek state must hand over public assets to an 
‘independent’ privatisation fund. On top of that, more austerity has to be injected 
into a shrinking economy and any legislation passed in the Greek parliament that 
is deemed unsuitable by the Eurozone's overlords has to be reversed. At present, 
outlandish and unconstitutional additional ‘contingency measures’ worth .6 billion 
are asked by IMF in particular to be triggered in the event that Greece fails to meet 
its onerous fiscal targets. 
 
A capitulated Greece would be turned into an economic ‘protectorate’, one 
purred, where all the decisions would be taken by foreign governments, unelected 
European Union bureaucrats and self-styled technocrats. Greece becomes the 
locus where liberal, progressive illusions are to be shattered. 
 
 
4. Proposals for a Temporary Resolution of the Greek 
Crisis 
The imminent question is how to sustain and rebuild the Greek economy, crucially 
without exiting the Eurozone; a country that has no access in the markets for 
                                                     
13 A mere 11% of the total loans directly financed government activities in a country that does not 
have access to international markets since the spring of 2010. 
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raising debt, has to confront the bailout creditors and abandon their economic 
illiterate programme for lunatic fiscal adjustments until viable and sustainable 
agreements are reached14. 
We are extremely averse to suggestions that Greece exits the Eurozone and 
reverts to a national currency, historically the drachma. Such a resolution could 
have been considered and assessed back in April 2010, prior to the first bailout 
plan. At present, and after 6 years of fierce austerity measures, massive internal 
devaluation and drop of living standards, exiting the Eurozone will be just rubbing 
salt in deep wounds; the whirlwind of such an action, in the short/medium run, 
for both the economic and social spheres will undoubtedly be devastating. Longer 
run benefits are also very questionable for a relatively closed and distressed 
economy such as Greece. 
There is another, equally important reason that we strongly favour that Greece 
remains, officially at least, in the Eurozone. The common currency was an 
outgrowth of efforts that began in the mid-20th century, as Europe reeled from 
the carnage of two world wars. The Euro was not just an economic project that 
sought to improve standards of living by increasing the efficiency of resource 
allocations, pursuing the principles of comparative advantage, enhancing 
competition, taking advantage of economies of scale and strengthening economic 
stability. More importantly, it was a political project that was supposed to enhance 
the political integration of Europe, enabling Europe's historical diversity to 
function effectively and collectively. 
It is the neoliberal economic and political elites that are failing the noble intentions 
of the founders of the European Union, the common currency area and their 
citizens. A flawed architecture was designed, driven by an unwavering faith in 
monopolistic/oligopolistic markets of modern global capitalism , one size-fits all 
policies, central bank focusing solely on inflation- as opposed to the mandate of 
the Federal Reserve in the US, which incorporates unemployment, growth and 
stability. It is not simply that the Eurozone is void of a set of proper institutions to 
accommodate Europe's economic diversity; it is rather that the structure of the 
Eurozone, its rules and regulations as they stand, that are not designed to promote 
growth, employment and stability for the member states. 
Under this diagnosis, we proceed next to address the central question of this 
paper, asked above, in a manner that not only will avert the dissolution of the 
                                                     
14 Hatgioannides, Karanassou and Sala (2016) propose the following actions regarding the re-
orientation of the Euro and an ending to the crisis: (i) Writing-off the debt of ailing member states 
in excess of the Maastricht criterion of 60% of their GDP; (ii) Credible and heavy-touch auditing of 
the so-called SIFIs by a new independent public pan-Eurozone body that is accountable to both 
national and European parliaments; (iii) Formal and complete separation of retail and investment 
banking along the lines of the Glass-Steagall Act for this part of the banking industry that managed 
to recapitalise itself without delving deeply into the public purse, and (iv) Reboot the ECB and 
change its mandate (explicit nominal GDP and unemployment rate targets). 
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Eurozone but will also shake discredited neoliberal beliefs and economic 
functioning. 
We propose (i) the adoption of a parallel currency15, (ii) temporary default on the 
loans owed to official creditors but servicing all private loans with the strategic 
objective to regain market access in the future, (iii) nationalisation of the central 
bank and the systemic commercial banks, (iv) partial recapitalisation of the 
(nationalised) commercial banks using the newly issued currency, and (v) the 
introduction of capital controls. 
We should stress that our five proposals should be envisaged as a singleton and 
implemented as a whole, since they will work synergistically in offering credibility 
and viability to our alternative plan. 
We view the temporary default on the loans owed to official creditors as a rightful 
and economically plausible action. It is clear from Table 2 above that only a small 
fraction of the debt burden of Greece during the tumultuous post 2010 period was 
actually used for servicing the Greek state's operating needs. Official partners in 
the bailout programmes such as the IMF are also pressing for a significant debt 
relief. 
The systemic commercial banks are already recapitalised directly by the Greek 
taxpayers to the order of 48.2billion Euros as of the beginning of 2015, see Table 
2, and by a further 12-15billion Euros up to the present, totaling nearly a third of 
the Greek GDP. Unless one is (ideologically) convinced for an a priori private 
business model, formal, albeit temporary, nationalization of the Greek banking 
system is duly sanctioned. 
We elaborate below on our key proposal and contribution, namely the adoption 
of a parallel currency, which may be pertinent not only for Greece but for other 
troubled nations within the Eurozone, foremost Italy, given the current state of its 
economy and of the banking system. Historically, complementary currencies, 
especially in areas of high unemployment or underemployment, were successfully 
implemented ever since the Great Depression of the 1930s in the US, Canada, 
Western Europe and elsewhere (for details, see Lietaer (2001)). Complementary 
currencies have proved a key tool in buffering a region from the shocks caused by 
the failures and crises in the official money system, as we are evidencing today 
within the Eurozone, and have fuelled a cooperative "domestic" economy 
operating in parallel with a competitive global economy driven by the official 
currency, namely the Euro. 
                                                     
15 See Munchau (2015). Stiglitz (2015) also points out that an alternative way to exit the crisis might 
be moving towards a dual currency circulation, using both the Euro and a "Greek Euro", a currency 
that would be tradable only within the country's own banking system. He draws also on the 
experience of Argentina and the astonishing resemblances between Greece and Argentina in being 
choked by austerity, experiencing rising unemployment, poverty and immense suffering. 
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In our modern take, the parallel currency would be issued in the form of 
government IOUs denominated in Euros at a parity of one-for-one and constitute 
legal tender inside Greece. At first, IOUs could be used to pay directly the public 
sector workers and pensioners. 
As public fiat, it would be a form of social relationship based upon trust (as indeed, 
every currency in the post Bretton Woods era). In order to avert inflationary 
concerns and discounting in a possible ‘black market’, the issuance of IOUs will be 
restricted to service the monthly payroll and would be collateralized with the stock 
of Euros deposited in central/commercial banks of the country. For Greece in 
particular, the stock of Euros deposited in commercial banks is in excess of 70 
billion Euros to present. 
Liquidity would be sustained when people and companies with banking accounts 
use `claims on bank deposits' instead of Euro notes, which they will no longer be 
able to obtain from their bank. Such deposit receipts will be the IOUs of the 
nationalised banking sector, fully redeemable to Euros at a parity of one-for-one 
(should the political impasse with the Eurozone's creditors ends), and will serve as 
legal tender as well. 
Once a parallel currency is created, the nationalised central bank has also to avert 
hoarding. Every time someone hoards currency, by definition, its lack of circulation 
deprives other people of being able to perform transactions. The more 
sophisticated forms of complementary currency of the 1930s included a 
circulation incentive feature recommended by Silvio Gesell16. 
He proposed a ‘stamp scrip’ mechanism; the core idea was to encourage people 
and companies to circulate the money through an anti-hoarding fee (technically 
called ‘demurrage’, a word dating back to the railroads' practice of charging a fee 
for leaving a railroad car inactive). The back of each note, or deposit receipt in our 
scheme, typically had 12 boxes, one for each month, where an official stamp could 
be affixed. Any bill, to remain valid, had to have its stamps up to date. 
What will be the impact on the Greek economy's external position and most 
importantly on vital imports of oil/gas and pharmaceutical products? Manageable, 
since unlike the small economies of northern Europe, Greece is a relatively closed 
economy; about three quarters of its GDP is domestic. Of the quarter that is not, 
most comes from tourism (approximately 18% of Greek GDP in 2014) which will 
also bring into the country valuable Euros and other foreign currency to finance 
the vital imports paid in the official Euro currency17.    
                                                     
16 In 1891, Silvio Gesell described the velocity of money as a decisive factor in determining the level 
of prices, preparing the ground for Irving Fisher's celebrated work of the 1920s. Two Nobel Prize 
winners in economics, Maurice Allais and Lawrence Klein have joined in the earlier praise by Keynes 
and Fisher of Gesell's contributions in monetary economics (see Lietaer (2001). 
17 Euros will be exchangeable to IOUs at a parity of one-for-one and other foreign currency at 
market rates. Tourists will be able to exchange any unwanted IOUs to their imported currency upon 
departure from Greece. 
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Such an unorthodox scheme, however mountainous and courageous to 
implement, will cushion the Greek economy against a total collapse, avert further 
capitulation together with the perils of internal devaluation and shake the 
Eurozone, and the EU by and large, to its foundations. 
There is little doubt that the wrath of the official creditors will follow. More likely 
than not, the ECB that supervises Greek banks, would view the government IOU's 
as ‘Mickey Mouse’ money, cut off their liquidity through the Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA) mechanism and potentially revoke their licenses. 
The irony and tragedy though is that at the end of June 2015 capital controls were 
in place in Greece, commercial banks and the stock exchange were closed, citizens 
could only withdraw up to per day, all without the adoption of a parallel currency, 
because the ECB temporarily froze the ELA. 
During a historic weekend in the 11th and 12th of July 2015, Wolfang Schauble, 
the German finance minister, insisted on 5-year Greek exit from the Eurozone, a 
‘timeout’ as he called it, that ‘could perhaps be a better way for Greece than the 
proposed  bailout package’. In reality, the most powerful member state pushes for 
the expulsion of another, tormented one. In doing so, creditor nations reverted to 
the nationalist European power struggles of the early 20th century; they 
demolished the idea of a monetary union as the stepping stone towards a 
democratic fiscal and political union. 
The pretense of irreversibility is what distinguishes a true monetary union from a 
fixed-exchange rate system with a shared currency. The coup of the 11/12th July 
2015 demoted the Eurozone into the latter system, held together by the threat of 
absolute destitution for those who challenge the prevailing order. 
 
5. Déjà Vu? 
The situation in the Eurozone today bears an eerie similarity to that of Europe in 
the interwar period, especially when the ruling elites of the creditor countries are 
trapped in similar orthodoxies to those of the post-WWI years. Ironically, Germany 
was then in a similar position to that of the periphery countries, Greece in 
particular. It was weighted down with its government debt because of the brutal 
reparations imposed at Versailles; its banking system was undercapitalized as the 
result of the hyperinflation of the early 1920s, and worse, it had become 
dependent on foreign borrowing at punitive rates. Germany was locked into the 
absolutism of the gold standard, which it dared not tamper with for fear of 
provoking a confidence crisis. When the Great Depression hit and private markets 
shut down, Germany had no choice but to impose bestial austerity with 
unemployment rising to 35% and populism surging. 
Like today, in the beginning of the 1930s there was one major economy bestowed 
with prolonged large current account surpluses and low unemployment. France 
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was deemed to act as the locomotive of growth for the rest of the continental 
Europe18. Beggar-thy-neighbor policies were framing the mindset of the economic 
rulers in France who were (i) refusing to accept responsibility of their version of 
mercantilism and its dire effects in the proximity of Europe, and (ii) in sheer denial 
of the necessity of expansionary policies and direct lending to Germany, fearing 
that they would be throwing good money after bad. The effect of such an 
opportunistic and short-sighted French policy was to herald the enthronement of 
a populist totalitarian regime that steered the world into the savagery and 
traumas of WWII19. 
John Maynard Keynes's prophetic work, `The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace' ([1920]2012), was ignored by the powerhouses of the 1920s and 1930s. In 
his capacity as the official representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919, J. M. Keynes felt compelled to resign when it became clear to 
him that there was no hope for substantial modifications in the draft Terms of 
Peace. In his diatribe, he lays the ground of his objection to the Treaty, and 
dedicates his book "to the formation of the general opinion of the future" (ib., 
p.77). The following extract is revealing. 
"...with every one owing everyone else immense sums of money. Germany owes a 
large sum to the Allies; the Allies owe a large sum to Great Britain; and Great 
Britain owes a large sum to the United States. The holders of war loan in every 
country are owed a large sum by the State; and the State in its turn is owed a large 
sum by these and other taxpayers. The whole position is in the highest degree 
artificial, misleading, and vexatious. We shall never be able to move again, unless 
we can free our limbs from these paper shackles. A general bonfire is so great a 
necessity that unless we can make of it an orderly and good-tempered affair...it 
will, when it comes at last, grow into a conflagration that may destroy much else 
as well" (ib., p.73).  
How pertinent and topical for the current malaises of the Eurozone is his nearly 
100-years-old conviction for a collective reordering of debts and the necessity for 
adopting a new economic paradigm. 
 
                                                     
18 France returned to the gold standard in 1928 - by 1932 French gold had risen from 12% to 28% 
of the world reserves. Notably, when Greece required financial assistance to overcome the dire 
straits of that period, "the French delegate advocated closing schools and cutting the salaries of 
public employees by 20 percent" (Bloomberg, 2012). 
19 Mouré's (2002) study is enlightening: "...the rhetoric of the gold standard, with its claims for 
automatic adjustment and a natural regulation of prices and external balance, is argued to have 
contributed significantly to misperceptions of the economic problems of the inter-war period, 
producing miss-prescriptions in order to resolve them. In this sense, gold standard rhetoric misled 
inter-war policy, with the Great Depression of the 1930s part of the price paid for the gold standard 
illusion" (ib., p.15). The point made by Mouré is that even if a structurally flawed gold standard 
system pushed inter-war economies towards major slumps (as Eichengreen, 1995, argues in the 
`Golden Fetters' analysis), policy prescriptions played a crucial role in the timing and severity of the 
depression. 
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6. Conclusions 
Economic convergence and shared growth were perceived as the intrinsic features 
of a `brave new world' in the Eurozone. Within a decade of its creation and in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, fiscal retrenchment has being undersigned as 
the sole recipe for the economic survival of the union. The Eurozone, given its 
marked imbalances and asymmetric economic performance of its member states 
since its recreation, reminisces more a fixed exchange rate area with a shared 
currency than a true monetary union with a common currency. 
This paper addressed the flawed economics of the architecture behind the bailout 
plans for Greece and the adverse impact of austerity programmes upon its 
economy. For the first time in the literature, we documented the composition of 
the soaring Greek debt and most importantly its use not to benefiting a 
"profligate" Greek state but rather overwhelmingly to avoiding the write downs of 
bad loans made by reckless creditors (mainly, German and French banks) to the 
Greek government and Greek private banks. We offered also our proposals for a 
temporary resolution of the Greek drama, whilst Greece stays in the Eurozone, 
primarily via the adoption of a parallel currency. 
Dealing with the fallacy of composition, where the collective austerity 
programmes and deleveraging of the private sector together with unconventional 
monetary policies such as quantitative easing are the roadmap to rescue the 
Eurozone as a whole, and Greece in particular, from its macroeconomic downhill, 
self-defeating internal devaluations and disintegration, the views of two of the 
most prominent scholars sitting on different ends of the economic spectrum are 
compelling. 
On the liberal side, the 1930s Chicago School economist Henry C. Simons argued 
that "For the moment, however, attention must be focused on the task of escaping 
from the present affliction of extreme unemployment and underproduction. 
Unless the immediate crisis can be dealt with, there is no sense in talking about 
long-run policy. ...consequently, main reliance must be placed on "reflationary" 
government spending. ... Inflationary fiscal policy is dangerous, to be sure - but 
not so dangerous as the alternatives. …Measures of this kind must be undertaken, 
merely to keep running a system which banking and monopoly have brought to its 
present plight" (Simons, [1934]1948, p.74). On the Keynesian side, John Maynard 
Keynes ([1920]2012) policy recommendations for a collective reordering of debts 
and re-orientation of the economic mindset were ignored by the powerhouses of 
the 1920s and 1930s. 
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